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Article 3

THE RANGE OF VISION RULE IN NEBRASKA
Richard L. Schmeling*
I. ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
As the automobile came into general use and accidents multiplied, the courts soon found it necessary to develop new legal
concepts in order to adapt to the increasing volume of motor
vehicle accident litigation. One such development was the "range
of vision" rule. The first statement of this rule in the United States
was made in 1909 in Lauson v. Fond du Lac,' a case which arose
when an automobile crashed through an unlighted barricade one
night and plunged into a ditch. The evidence showed that the single
headlight on the auto illuminated the highway from ten to twenty
feet ahead and that the vehicle, traveling at eight miles per hour,
could not have been brought to a stop short of fifteen to twenty
feet. The court laid down the rule that:
[Tlhe driver of an automobile ... is not exercising ordinary care
if he is driving the car at such a speed that he cannot bring it to
a standstill within the distance he can plainly see objects or obstructions ahead of him. If his light be such that he can see objects
for only a distance of 10 feet, then he should so regulate his speed
as to be able to stop his machine within that distance, and, if he
fails to do so, and an accident results from such failure, no recovery
can be had.2
The first case to apply the range of vision rule in Nebraska was
Roth v. Blomquist,3 decided in 1928. Plaintiff Roth was driving

about thirty-five miles per hour during the early evening when
defendant's employee drove an unlighted, horsedrawn wagon across
the highway and was struck by Roth. Regarding the duty of a
driver traveling at night, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
he must:
... have such a headlight as will enable him to see in advance the
face of the highway and to discover grade crossings or other obstacles in his path, and to keep such control of his car as will
enable him to stop and avoid obstructions that fall within his vision.
... [It then observed that] this general rule is supported by sound
reasons and the overwhelming weight of authority. When applicable to the facts, a violation is of itself negligence precluding a
recovery in favor of
the motorist for resulting injuries to himself
or to his property. 4
* B.A.,

1962; J.D. 1965, University of Nebraska; member Nebraska State
Bar.
1 141 Wis. 57, 123 N.W. 629 (1909).
2 Id. at 60, 123 N.W. at 630.
3 117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W. 572 (1928).
4 Id. at 446, 220 N.W. at 572-73.
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The court pointed out that according to plaintiff's own testimony
he first saw the wagon at a distance of twenty to twenty-five feet.
The fact that he was unable to stop before striking the wagon demonstrated that plaintiff had been driving at a speed so great that
he could not stop within the range of his headlights' illumination,
and was, therefore, negligent.
The final step in the formulation of the range of vision rule in
Nebraska occurred in Cotten v. Stolley. 5 In Cotten, the plaintiff
was pushing a baby carriage along the right hand side of the road
at night when struck by defendant's car. The court stated that the
rule laid down in Roth was applicable and that the defendant was
guilty of negligence as a matter of Zaw.6 Cotten thus clarified the
holding in Roth and laid down the current rule in Nebraska,7 that
124 Neb. 855, 248 N.W. 384 (1933).
6 Id. at 861, 248 N.W. at 386.
7 Waite v. Briggs, 175 Neb. 104, 120 N.W.2d 547 (1963); Mabe v. Gross,
167 Neb. 593, 94 N.W.2d 12 (1959); Guerin v. Forburger, 161 Neb. 824,
74 N.W.2d 870 (1956); Davis v. Spindler, 156 Neb. 276, 56 N.W.2d 107
(1952); Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401, 34 N.W.2d 757 (1948); Buresh
v. George, 149 Neb. 340, 31 N.W.2d 106 (1948); Anderson v. Robbins
Incubator Co., 143 Neb. 40, 8 N.W.2d 446 (1943); Redwelski v. Omaha
& Council Bluffs St. Ry., 137 Neb. 681, 290 N.W. 904 (1940); Anderson
v. Lee, 130 Neb. 258, 264 N.W. 666 (1936); Cotton v. Stolley, 124 Neb.
855, 248 N.W. 384 (1933); Murphy v. Shibiya, 125 Neb. 487, 250 N.W.
746 (1933).
It is perhaps somewhat misleading to say that in Nebraska one
5

who violates the range of vision rule is negligent as a matter of law
without taking into consideration the effect of the comparative negli-

gence statute, NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 25-1151 (Reissue 1964). The statute
requires that when contributory negligence is urged to preclude
recovery by the plaintiff such negligence will not defeat recovery
if the negligence of the plaintiff is slight compared to that of the
defendant. The question then arises as to the degree of the negligence
of a plaintiff or defendant who has violated the range of vision rule.
Few Nebraska cases discuss this point, but it is submitted that
McQueen v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 293 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1961),
correctly handles this problem. There the court states, after analyzing
the various Nebraska decisions: "If this court should hold that the
defendant here were guilty of such negligence as a matter of law
that the issue of comparative negligence should not have been given
to the jury, it would go far to undermine the positive requirements
of the comparative negligence statute. When the Roth doctrine has
been applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court, it has done so on the
theory that the party against whom it is applied is guilty of ordinary
negligence as a matter of law, and where there has been an issue of
comparative negligence it has been submitted to the jury." Id. at 594.
Thus, negligence under the Roth rule is not in and of itself gross
negligence for purposes of the comparative negligence statute. Neither
is it gross negligence within the meaning of the guest statute, Fairman
v. Cook, 142 Neb. 893, 8 N.W.2d 315 (1943).
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one who drives at a speed such that he cannot stop within the range
of his vision, whether he be a plaintiff8 or a defendant, 9 is negligent
as a matter of law.
The range of vision rule, as it has been developed and refined
by the Nebraska Supreme Court, involves two separate elements:
speed and lookout. The first of these elements, speed, is illustrated
by Roth where the driver was simply traveling at such a speed that
he could not stop within the area of the road illuminated by his
headlights.
The lookout aspect of the rule is perhaps best illustrated by
Stanley v. Ebmeier.10 In that case the plaintiff, Stanley, was approaching an intersection in his pickup truck and slowed to make a
left turn onto the intersecting road. Defendant's driver was following Stanley in an oil transport and met a flatbed truck with a
brooder house on it. There was evidence that the oil transport
driver took his eyes off the road to look at the brooder house and
when he turned his attention back to the road, he noticed for the
first time that Stanley had slowed to make a turn. The transport
driver was unable to stop in time and crashed into the rear of
Stanley's pickup. The Nebraska Supreme Court held the oil transport driver negligent as a matter of law, citing the range of vision
rule and quoting from the earlier Nebraska case of Bramhall v.
Adcock'- to the effect that:
The basis of the foregoing general rule is that the driver of an
automobile is legally and mandatorily obligated to keep such a
lookout that he can see what is plainly visible before him and
to operate his automobile in such a manner that he can stop it and
avoid collision with any object in front of him.12
The oil transport driver had probably been driving at a sufficient

interval behind the pickup driven by Stanley initially, but his
momentary inattention to the road ahead allowed the interval to
narrow rapidly, and, when the oil transport driver directed his
attention back to the traffic lane in front of him, the pickup was no

longer outside his stopping distance.
The viability of the range of vision rule is at least questionable
in 1969, when the assumptions of that rule as initially set forth are
subjected to examination. Those assumptions are perhaps best set
out in the case which initially espoused the range of vision rule in
the United States, Lauson v. Fond du Lac:
8 Guerin v. Forburger, 161 Neb. 824, 74 N.W.2d 870 (1956).
9 Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401, 34 N.W.2d 757 (1948).
10 166 Neb. 716, 90 N.W.2d 290 (1958).
11 162 Neb. 198, 75 N.W.2d 696 (1956).
12 166 Neb. at 729, 90 N.W.2d at 298 (1958).
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The driver on a country road knows that bridges and culverts
must be rebuilt; that highways must be repaired; that washouts
occasionally occur; that live stock [sic] roam about the roads unattended; that travelers on foot, on horseback, and in various kinds
of vehicles are found using the highways at all seasons of the
year and at all times of the day and night. Such a driver has no
right to expect and does not expect a free and unobstructed right
of way over a well-defined track, as does the engineer of a locomotive or even the motorman of an electric car. 13

While this may have been an accurate description of the perils
of highway travel in 1909, it is clearly inapplicable to the society
and highway system we find sixty years later. Therefore, an analysis of both the scope and application of the rule, in Nebraska and
other states as well, in conjunction with positing some remedial
alternatives is very much in order.
II.

SCOPE OF THE RULE

A. WHEN RULE APPLIED-RELATIONSHIP OF STRIING VEHICLE TO
OBJECT STRUCK
(1)

Moving Vehicle Colliding with Stationary Object in Its Lane
of Traffic

The range of vision rule has most frequently been applied where
a driver strikes an obstruction which is relatively stationary, either
in his own lane of travel or on the right shoulder of the road. Nebraska decisions have applied the Roth rule where the obstruction
completely blocked the right hand lane of travel,'14 where the obstruction only partially blocked the lane of travel 15 and where the
obstruction was on the shoulder of the road but was so close to the
lane of travel that it interfered with normal traffic.' 6 It is clear,
however, that the obstruction need not be stationary. Several cases
have applied the rule where
the vehicles struck were moving very
17
slowly or were stopping.
13 141 Wis. 57, 59-60, 123 N.W. 629, 630 (1909).

14
15
16
17

Mundy v. Davis, 154 Neb. 423, 48 N.W.2d 394 (1951).
Anderson v. Robbins Incubator Co., 143 Neb. 40, 8 N.W.2d 446 (1943).
Buresh v. George, 149 Neb. 340, 31 N.W.2d 106 (1948).
Guerin v. Forburger, 161 Neb. 824, 74 N.W.2d 870 (1956) (truck moving very slowly); Greyhound Corp. v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel
Corp., 161 Neb. 152, 72 N.W.2d 669 (1955)

(bus slowed down and

stopped in front of truck). The recent case of Newkirk v. Kovanda,
184 Neb. 127, 165 N.W.2d 576 (1969), even applied the range of vision
rule to a motorist who had come to a halt behind a stopped vehicle

and then struck it when he tried to pull out around it. Three justices
dissented arguing that the rule had no application to a situation of
this nature.
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(2)

Vehicles Approaching One Another on Hilltops and Curves

The rule has also been applied to vehicles which collided as
they met on hills or curves where the driver's range of vision was
shortened. 8 For instance, in Most v. Cedar County,19 where a
motorcycle came over the crest of a hill and collided with a road
scraper being operated up the wrong side of the hill against traffic,
the court held that the motorcyclist was negligent in not being able
to avoid the collision.
In Ross v. Carroll,20 the court applied the range of vision rule
where two trucks collided on a blind curve. The driver of the truck
which had swerved into the wrong lane was held negligent as a
matter of law for not being able to stop or avoid hitting the other
truck.
A later Nebraska case 2 ' held that the rule should not be applied
to vehicles meeting one another on a curve, impliedly, but not
Is Hardung v. Sheldon, 133 Neb. 427, 275 N.W. 586 (1937) (cars collide
head on at hill top); Ross v. Carroll, 138 Neb. 1, 291 N.W. 726 (1940)
(trucks collide in middle of blind curve). Contra, Fulcher v. Ike, 142
Neb. 418, 6 N.W.2d 610 (1942) (defendant came over crest of hill,
struck car that was stopped in his lane of travel, court refused to
apply rule since defendant's lights shown upward as he topped hill,
thus not revealing stopped car). Only one Nebraska case has been
found which has applied the range of vision rule to a vehicle attempting to make a left turn. In Davis v. Spindler, 156 Neb. 276, 56 N.W.2d
107 (1952), a truck driver who attempted to make a left turn into
a filling station collided with a car traveling the opposite direction.
The court applied the range of vision rule and held the truck driver
negligent as a matter of law for not being able to stop before he
struck the car which entered his range of vision as he started his turn.
The Nebraska court refused to apply the range of vision rule in
the one Nebraska case in which the rule was asserted to be applicable
to vehicles meeting on a straight and level portion of road where the
range of vision of neither driver was obstructed. This case, O'Neill v.
Henke, 167 Neb. 631, 94 N.W.2d 322 (1959), arose when a driver, who
had been drinking and weaving recklessly at seventy miles per hour
down a gravel road, swerved into the path of an oncoming truck.
The court refused to hold the truck driver negligent as a matter of
law for not being able to stop when the car swerved into his path.
Due to the extremely reckless conduct of the driver of the car and
the fact that he had been drinking, this case did not present a clearcut opportunity to the court to decide whether the range of vision
rule would be applied to vehicles meeting on a straight and level
stretch of road. See also Bainter v. Appel, 124 Neb. 40, 245 N.W. 16
(1932) (plaintiff traveling at eight miles per hour through cloud of
dust collided head on with defendant's dump truck being driven on
wrong side of highway, court held range of vision rule not applicable).
19 126 Neb. 54, 252 N.W. 465 (1934).
20 138 Neb. 1, 291 N.W. 726 (1940).
21 Davis v. Dennert, 162 Neb. 65, 75 N.W.2d 112 (1956).
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expressly overruling the decision in Ross. Therefore, applicability
of the range of vision rule to such conditions as were presented in
Ross seems to be uncertain.
(3)

Objects Turning or Crossing in Front of Driver
22
The first range of vision case in Nebraska, Roth v. Blomquist,

held that the range of vision rule may be applied to a driver who
strikes another vehicle crossing his path. The rule was also held
applicable in Schwartz v. Hibdon23 where a slow-moving farm
tractor turned onto the highway in front of plaintiff's truck and
plaintiff was unable to stop before colliding with the tractor. In
Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. 24 the rule was similarly
applied where a girl on a bicycle turned left into an alley in front
of a city bus driven by defendant's driver.
(4)

One Vehicle Overtaking and Passing Another

It has been established that the range of vision rule will not be
applied to a driver who increases his speed to overtake and pass
another vehicle traveling in the same direction.
In Warren v. Bostock,2 5 the plaintiff attempted to pass the defendant as the defendant moved into the left lane to make a left
turn onto a county road and the plaintiff hit the rear of defendant's
pickup truck. Defendant alleged that plaintiff was negligent as a
matter of law in not being able to stop within the range of his
vision. The Nebraska Supreme Court observed:
This rule [range of vision] recognized in certain situations,

has no application to an operator of a vehicle who undertakes to
pass another. The very nature of the movement contemplates
the one engaged in passing another vehicle will travel at a greater
speed than the vehicle being passed. The application of the rule
to one engaged in passing another vehicle would effectively prevent passing other vehicles on a highway without
being subject
to a charge of negligence as a matter of law. 26
22

117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W. 572 (1928). Contra,Union Pac. R. Co. v. DenverChicago Trucking Co., 202 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1953)

23
24
2z

(truck struck switch

engine moving slowly across highway, engine moving slowly when
first seen by driver; court held driver not contributorily negligent
as a matter of law in not being able to stop within the range of his
headlights; court said driver had right to assume engine would stop
and let him pass before proceeding across highway).
174 Neb. 12.9, 116 N.W.2d 187 (1962).

151 Neb. 431, 37 N.W.2d 607 (1949).

170 Neb. 203, 102 N.W.2d 55 (1960).
26 Id. at 207, 102 N.W.2d at 58. The holding in Warren was followed in

the more recent case of Scoffield v. Haskell, 180 Neb. 324, 142 N.W.2d
597 (1966).
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B. SPECIAL CONITnIoNs CAUSING A Daivm's RANGE OF VISION TO DECREASE

The presence of certain vision-reducing conditions, such as
snow,2 smoke,28 dust,O blinding glare from the sun 0 and fog or
mist,8 1 have been held to impose upon a driver the duty to travel
at a slower speed and to be more watchful than would normally
27 Doleman v. Burandt, 160 Neb. 745, 71 N.W.2d 521 (1955) (heavy snow;
plaintiff held negligent as a matter of law; court held, however, his
contributory negligence not proximate cause of accident that occurred
when defendant's truck broke through snow drift on wrong side
of road); Allen v. Clark, 148 Neb. 627, 28 N.W.2d 439 (1947) (snow
and fog); Fairman v. Cook, 142 Neb. 893, 8 N.W.2d 315 (1943) (heavy
snow; issue of negligence submitted to jury since gross negligence
had to be shown under guest statute); Murphy v. Sibiya, 125 Neb.
487, 250 N.W. 746 (1933) (snow).
28 Anderson v. Byrd, 132 Neb. 588, 272 N.W. 572 (1937), former opinion
withdrawn and judgment affirmed, modified on rehearing, 133 Neb.
483, 275 N.W. 825 (1937) (smoke held to be a condition and not an
intervening cause).
29 Reeder v. Rinne, 183 Neb. 734, 164 N.W.2d 203 (1969) (defendant
traveling 55 m.p.h. on country road went through two clouds of
heavy dust and hit rear of truck traveling in same direction); Bosiljevac v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 182 Neb. 199, 153 N.W.2d 864
(1967) (motorcyclist traveling down gravel road following car which
was raising cloud of dust, motorcyclist turned onto private road
and hit chain blocking it, throwing him from machine, held driver
negligent as a matter of law); Allen v. Kavanaugh, 160 Neb. 645, 71
N.W.2d 119 (1955) (plaintiff traveling dusty road at night and hit
defendant's vehicle stalled in middle of highway, no recovery for
plaintiff); Huston v. Robinson, 144 Neb. 553, 13 N.W.2d 885 (1944)
(dust blowing across highway which obscured driver's vision, held
driver was negligent in not reducing speed).
80 Elliott v. Swift & Co., 151 Neb. 787, 39 N.W.2d 617 (1949) (driver
traveling eastward into rising sun, blinded by it and did not see car
approaching from south at crossroad).
81 Guerin v. Forburger, 161 Neb. 824, 74 N.W.2d 870 (1956) (mist; plaintiff attempted to use its presence to excuse his hitting stopped truck;
held that the mist was a condition requiring greater care and not
an intervening cause); Fridley v. Brush, 161 Neb. 318, 73 N.W.2d 376
(1955) (dicta as to fog; evidence did not prove fog was actually present at time of accident); Dickenson v. County of Cheyenne, 146
Neb. 36, 18 N.W.2d 559 (1945) (plaintiff failed to turn where county
road came to a dead end; fog present; court held presence of fog
required driver to travel at a slower speed; fact that dead end poorly
marked held immaterial); Fischer v. Megan, 138 Neb. 420, 293 N.W. 287
(1940) (truck struck train crossing highway; fog and rain). See also
Barney v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 179, 75 N.W.2d 683 (1956), which seems to
hold that icy highways require reduced speed under the range of
vision rule. This is the only Nebraska case which indicates that a
weather condition which does not shorten the driver's range of vision
brings the range of vision rule into play. Other conditions such as
snow and sleet increase one's stopping distance but also shorten the
driver's range of vision.
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be required. These conditions materially reduce the distance a
driver can see and identify objects in the road ahead, and the court
has held that they are conditions rather than intervening causes,
and that a driver who strikes an object because of the presence of
one or more of these conditions will not be excused for having
violated the range of vision rule.
In Mundy v. Davis,32 the evidence showed that defendant was
driving during a heavy snow storm. A number of cars were stopped
in the right hand lane of travel, the last one belonging to the plaintiff who had left his car and was standing behind it. The defendant
was unable to stop as he came upon the line of cars and smashed
into plaintiff's car, pinning plaintiff between the two vehicles. In
holding the defendant negligent as a matter of law, the court
pointed out that the driver "knew the conditions of the road
and the fact that his visibility was limited by the falling snow.
In view thereof he was duty bound to drive at such a rate of speed
that he could stop when an object came within the area lighted
by his headlights." 33 This he failed to do.
The Nebraska court was undecided for a while as to whether
accidents caused by glaring headlights from approaching vehicles,
which momentarily decrease a driver's range of vision, should give
rise to the application of the range of vision rule. In Giles v.
Welsh,34 the first Nebraska case in which this question arose, the
court refused to hold a driver negligent as a matter of law because
he did not slow down when temporarily blinded by the lights of an
approaching car and struck a stalled gasoline transport. The court
reached the opposite result, however, in Nichols v. Havlat,35 a case
in which a truck struck an inebriate who had been seen staggering
around in the middle of the street. Defendant truck driver claimed
the lights from an approaching car blinded him so that he did not
see the man until the truck was two to three feet from him. The
court said:
[T]he existence and presence of smoke, snow, fog, mist, blinding
headlights, or other similar elements which materially impair or
wholly destroy visibility, are not to be deemed intervening causes,
but rather as conditions which impose upon the drivers of automobiles the duty to assure the safety of the public by the exercise of care commensurate with such surrounding circumstances. 36
154 Neb. 423, 48 N.W.2d 394 (1951).
Id. at 431, 48 N.W.2d at 399.
34 122 Neb. 164, 239 N.W. 813 (1931).
35 140 Neb. 723, 1 N.W.2d 829 (1942).
36 Id. at 730, 1 N.W.2d at 834.
32

33
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The most recent case 37 to pass on the subject of blinding headlights follows the conclusion reached in Nichols, indicating that
the court is now firmly committed to the position that blinding
headlights are a condition rather than an intervening cause.
C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RuLE-NATURE OF THE OBJECT STRUCK
(1)

Night Driving

Even where the object struck was in a position in relation to
the vehicle which struck it so as to give rise to the application of
the range of vision rule, the court has refused to apply the rule if
the object struck was difficult to see. In Buresh v. George,38 the
court set out the underlying philosophy upon which the range of
vision rule is based, stating that a driver of an automobile is legally
obligated to keep such a lookout that he can see what is plainly
visible before him.
The range of vision rule -states that a driver must govern his
speed so that he will be able to stop short of plainly visible obstructions appearing before him, and thus not overdrive his range of
vision, but this rationale assumes a plainly visible obstruction. To
apply the rule to factual situations in which the object struck is not
plainly visible would be requiring the driver to do the impossible,
i.e., to see an object at a distance, which, because of its nature, could
not possibly be seen until the driver was quite close to it. No
matter how carefully the driver watched the road ahead and how
reasonably he governed his speed, he would not be able to see
such objects in time to stop before hitting them. In such a case the
object would finally become discernible well within the driver's
range of vision and short of his stopping distance, making it inequitable to apply the range of vision rule. Thus, an exception to the rule
has arisen where the object struck is not plainly visible.

37

Shields v. County of Buffalo, 161 Neb. 34, 71 N.W.2d 701 (1955);

Benton v. State, 124 Neb. 485, 247 N.W. 21 (1933). But see Pierson v.
Jensen, 150 Neb. 86, 33 N.W.2d 462 (1948) (car crashed into parked
truck which was partially on highway; plaintiff said he was blinded
by lights from approaching car; held not contributorily negligent as a
matter of law); and Mliers v. McMaken, 147 Neb. 133, 22 N.W.2d 422
(1946) (plaintiff blinded by approaching vehicle's lights, did not see
stalled truck in time to stop, swung left to avoid truck and hit oncoming truck; not held contributorily negligent as a matter of law). In
these two cases, it was apparently felt that the blinding headlights
contributed little in causing the accidents, since the objects struck
were not plainly visible.
38 149 Neb. 340, 31 N.W.2d 106 (1948).
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Many cases which have been held to fall within this exception
have involved motorists who collided with other vehicles which
were stalled or stopped on the highway and which were not
plainly visible either because their lights were off, they were
nearly the-same color as the highway surface on which they were
standing, or they were so dirty that they would not reflect light
from the headlights of vehicles approaching them from the rear.3
40
Illustrative of such an exception is Monasmith v. Cosden Oil Co.,

in which the defendant's car was stopped in the right hand lane
of traffic while defendant was fixing a flat tire. The car was faded
green, dusty, and nearly the same color as the gravel road on which
it was standing. The trunk lid was raised so that the rear window
was covered and could not reflect the plaintiff's headlights. The
court decided that this factual situation presented exceptional circumstances which made it inequitable to apply the general rule,
and it set out the test that:
Where an object on a highway in front of one driving thereon

at night is so nearly the color of the road that it may be difficult
to distinguish it until quite close, it cannot be said, as a matter
of law, that such person was guilty of more than slight negligence
in his failure to41see it in time to stop his car or to prevent running against it.
The court held that under such circumstances the driver would
not be held negligent as a matter of law, and his negligence, if any,
should be determined by the jury.
An exception has also been made for objects, other than stopped
or stalled vehicles, which were in the highway and were not plainly
39 Robins v. Sandoz, 175 Neb. 5, 120 N.W.2d 360 (1963)

40
41

(car with flat tire
partially on highway, dispute as to whether lights on or not; verdict
for defendant affirmed on second appeal); Robins v. Sandoz, 177 Neb.
894, 131 N.W.2d 648 (1964); Fick v. Herman, 159 Neb. 758, 68 N.W.2d
622 (1955) (gas transport out of gas, clearance lights blinking, flares
placed, back of truck muddy); Haight v. Nelson, 157 Neb. 341, 59
N.W.2d 576 (1953) (stalled car, dark, mud spattered, no lights on, dark
oil mat); Plumb v. Burnham, 151 Neb. 129, 36 N.W.2d 612 (1949)
(truck stalled, out of gas, lights off, no flares or flags); Pierson v.
Jensen, 150 Neb. 86, 33 N.W.2d 462 (1948) (truck unlighted, no flags
or flares); Dickman v. Hackney, 149 Neb. 367, 31 N.W.2d 232 (1948)
(back of car dirty, tail lights not lit); Miers v. McMaken, 147 Neb. 133,
22 N.W.2d 422 (1946) (truck stalled, out of gas, only corner of truck
projecting onto highway, no lights or flares, back of truck dirty);
Holberg v. McDonald, 137 Neb. 405, 289 N.W. 542 (1940) (green beet
truck stopped partially on black oil pavement with no lights burning,
no flares or warning devices placed); Lewis v. Rapid Transit Lines,
126 Neb. 158, 252 N.W. 804 (1934) (bus stalled in lane of travel without lights, mud spattered, appeared gray and blended with fog and
surface of highway).
124 Neb. 327, 246 N.W. 623 (1933).
Id. at 330, 246 N.W. at 624.
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visible.0 42 In Swinford v. Finck4 3 an endgate from a truck had been
left lying in the highway after it bounced loose from defendant's
cattle truck. Plaintiff's auto struck it, causing a blowout which
made plaintiff lose control of his car and go off the highway. The
court held that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, as a
matter of law, in not being able to stop before he hit the endgate.
The court pointed out that, since the endgate was lying flat in the
highway and was difficult to see until the driver was quite close
to it, the rule would not be applied.
The court has likewise made an exception to the rule where
motorists have struck pedestrians who were not plainly visible
because of clothing they were wearing, or because of their general
position in the road." Anderson v. Nincd.helser,5 a case which
Cromwell v. Fillmore County, 122 Neb. 114, 239 N.W. 735 (1931) (unprotected ditch and holes washed out by hard rain); Day v. Metropolitan Utils. Dist., 115 Neb. 711, 214 N.W. 647 (1927) (edge of dragline platform of unlighted dragline extending over streetcar track);
Frickel v. Lancaster County, 115 Neb. 506, 213 N.W. 826 (1927) (piles
of gravel along gravel road); Tutsch v. Omaha Structural Steel Works,
110 Neb. 585, 194 N.W. 731 (1923) (unguarded ditch and pile of dirt).
For an interesting case involving two cartons of lettuce in the road,
see Mabe v. Gross, 167 Neb. 593, 94 N.W.2d 12 (1959). Normally the
cartons of lettuce would have been within the exception to the general rule, since they were not "plainly visible." But the defendant
testified that he had seen the cartons beyond the range of his headlights in the headlights of oncoming cars. The court held the rule of
Roth v. Blomquist applied.
43 139 Neb. 886, 299 N.W. 227 (1941).
44
Heeney v. Churchill, 154 Neb. 848, 50 N.W.2d 72 (1951) (deceased
dressed in dark clothes, trees obstructed driver's view around curve,
lights thrown to left by curve did not pick up deceased walking along
right side of road); Weisenmiller v. Nestor, 153 Neb. 153, 43 N.W.2d
568 (1950) (plaintiff wearing dark clothes); Floyd v. Edwards, 150
Neb. 41, 33 N.W.2d 555 (1948) (deceased wearing dark blue overalls,
dark blue jacket, dark cap, street poorly lighted); Johnson v. AnokaButte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851, 5 N.W.2d 114 (1942) (deceased wearing dark clothes, truck moving slowly); Adamek v. Tilford, 125 Neb.
139, 249 N.W. 300 (1933) (man struck down by another car, lying
flat in street, dark clothes, street poorly lighted, pavement wet and
body same color as pavement). Contra, Beck v. Trustin, 177 Neb.
788, 131 N.W.2d 425 (1964) (man in dark blue and white checkered
overcoat crossing street); Stocker v. Roach, 140 Neb. 561, 300 N.W.
627 (1941) (car stalled, lady wearing black dress standing on blacktop behind car trying to flag traffic; plaintiff testified he saw something on highway; held case within range of vision rule); Anderson
v. Lee, 130 Neb. 258, 264 N.W. 666 (1936) (pedestrian struck was
visible for some distance, case submitted to jury under emergency
doctrine); Cotten v. Stolley, 124 Neb. 855, 248 N.W. 384 (1933) (lady
pushing baby buggy along right side of highway, no mention in opinion about color of her clothing).
45 152 Neb. 857, 43 N.W.2d 182 (1950).
42
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arose out of a jailbreak, is illustrative of this line of cases. Roadblocks were set up in an attempt to recapture the escapee. At one
such roadblock a car was parked along the right side of the highway with its parking lights on, and two men were stationed to flag
down passing cars with flashlights and check the occupants. Defendant's auto struck one of the men who was standing in the
middle of the highway with only a small flashlight to warn of his
presence. The court refused to hold defendant negligent as a matter
of law since it was shown that deceased was difficult to see at the
time of the accident. Rather, defendant's negligence, if any, was
for the jury to determine.
A recent case, Bartosh v. Schlautman,46 announces a rather significant corollary to the not plainly visible exception to the range
of vision rule. In that case the evidence was in dispute as to the
visibility of the plaintiff's tractor and wagon which had stalled in
the right hand lane of travel when the tractor's gears jammed.
Plaintiff immediately tried to repair the tractor but did not leave
the lights on nor did he place any flares or other warning devices.
There was conflicting evidence as to whether defendant's vehicle
struck plaintiff's wagon before or after sunset, the extent of the
darkness and the extent of visibility on the highway. One vehicle
traveling on the highway had seen the stopped wagon in time and
had passed it on the left. A second vehicle went into the right
hand ditch to avoid the wagon, and the third vehicle to approach
the wagon from the rear was defendant's truck.
At trial plaintiff requested the standard range of vision instruction, but the trial judge refused to give it, substituting general
instructions on control and lookout. Plaintiff assigned the refusal of
the trial judge to give the range of vision instruction as error on
appeal.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in the majority opinion by
Justice McCown, reviewed the evidence and concluded:
Under such circumstances, the exceptions involving visibility
of the object clearly applied rather than the general rule. Under
the evidence here, the giving of the instruction requested by the
plaintiff would not only have been confusing to the jury, it would
have been prejudicial to the defendant and did not correctly state
the law 47upon the issue presented by the pleadings and the
evidence.

46

47

181 Neb. 130, 147 N.W.2d 492 (1966).
Id. at 134-35, 147 N.W.2d at 495-96.
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The dissent of Chief Justice White, concurred in by Justice
Brower, argues that:
The parties pleaded the rule and the exception thereto, and
there was evidence to support a finding either way by the jury.
It was, therefore, the court's duty irrespective of any request to
properly instruct the jury as to the rule and as to the exceptions
thereto, as applicable to this case....
The majority opinion states: 'Where an exception clearly applies, the general rule does not apply.' The point is that this question is for the jury to determine under all the circumstances of
the case. This court has no right or power, as a matter of law, to
determine that an exception 'clearly applies' in this case. The evidence was conflicting. There was evidence to support the existence of the exceptions and to support a finding that the object was
not visible or discernible by the use of ordinary care. Surely the
jury was entitled to determine this essential fact of the case. The
majority opinion holds, in effect, that as a matter of law this case
comes within the exceptions to the rule. Although submitting the
case to the jury, the effect of the holding is to determine, as a
matter of law, that the tractor and the wagon could not be discovered 48by the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances.
The Chief Justice concludes:
It would seem that the range of vision rule, by the holding in
this case, is now withdrawn from jury consideration in the State
of Nebraska. If any evidence is introduced supporting the exceptions the rule is destroyed as far as the jury's consideration of it
is concerned. Moreover, the confusion that will result is apparent
from this case. The court in this case specifically holds that the
range of vision rule was submitted to the jury and that this was
proper. And yet, at the same time, this court holds that it was not
necessary or proper
for the court to instruct the jury as to the rules
of law applicable.49
Bartosh presents possibly the most significant range of vision
case to be decided in recent years. It appears that the court has
held, for the first time, that an exception to the rule applies as a
matter of law.
If the rule itself is justifiably criticized in that its operation
tends to withdraw jury consideration of what is often the central
issue of the case, the visibility of the object struck, then the remedy
provided in Bartosh is subject to the same criticism. If the rule is
to continue to remain viable as a part of Nebraska negligence law,
the better result in situations like Bartosh would be to set forth
in the instruction (NJI 7.03A) both the general rule and the exceptions, and allow the jury to apply the rule or exception as it may
48 Id. at 136-37, 147 N.W.2d at 496-97.
49 Id. at 138-39, 147 N.W.2d at 497.
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determine from its consideration of the testimony. If, however,
Bartosh should be read as the demise of the range of vision rule
altogether, a precise explanation in forthcoming opinions is clearly
needed. Bartosh leaves the range of vision rule in an extreme state
of confusion at best.
The question arises as to how close to the object struck before
he sees it must a driver be before he can claim that its "not plainly
visible" character excused his failure to avoid striking it. Two Nebraska cases have discussed this point and provide some guidance.
The most recent case is Guynan v. Olson,'° in which the defendant
driver struck the plaintiff who was mounted on a horse and herding
cattle across a bridge. The accident occurred at 6:50 A.M., and the
defendant testified that it was just about dawn and that he could
see 300 to 400 feet in front of him but that it was difficult to see and
distinguish objects at that time of day. Defendant placed his speed
at about 45 or 50 miles per hour. The trial court entered a judgment against the plaintiff, and the supreme court reversed, holding
that the trial court had erred in failing to instruct the jury to find
the defendant negligent as a matter of law. Defendant had argued
successfully in the trial court that, because the plaintiff had been
difficult to see, the exceptions to the range of vision rule should be
applied. The supreme court noted:
We do not believe this case comes within the exceptions. They
generally embrace factual situations involving various factors
which might reasonably be considered to relieve a driver of the
duty to see the object or vehicle in time to avoid it. They deal with
situations in which the driver did not see the object ahead of him
until a very short distance before he was upon it .... We feel that
if the rule applies at ali, at a minimum it must be applicable to
the situation present in this case. 51
The court cited as authority for its holding the earlier case of
Dryer v. MaIM 52 in which the plaintiff struck a flock of sheep which
completely blocked a county road. She testified that the sheep
were about 400 feet away from her when she first saw them as she
came over the crest of a hill. The court applied the general rule
and found her negligent as a matter of law.
Thus, it would seem that, for the exceptions to the general rule
to apply, the object struck must not only have been difficult to see,
but the driver must not have actually seen the object until he was
only a short distance away and too close to avoid the collision.
50 178 Neb. 335, 133 N.W.2d 571 (1965).
51 Id. at 339, 133 N.W.2d at 574.
52 163 Neb. 72, 77 N.W.2d 804 (1956).
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(2)

Daytime Travel

The range of vision rule is, of course, also applied to daylight
travel."" During day the driver's range of vision is the distance he
can see and identify objects in the road ahead, rather than the
"range of headlights" test applicable to nighttime travel The vast
majority of daytime cases have involved motorists who ran into
other motor vehicles which obstructed the highway,5 but there is
no reason why the court should not apply the rule to other types
of obstructions and pedestrians as well, as illustrated by the night-

time cases, where the object struck is "plainly visible."
The court has decided two daytime cases in which the object
struck was not "plainly visible" and was held to be within the ex-

ceptions to the general rule. In Andelt v. County of Seward,55 a
vehicle was driven into a deep ditch, dug to repair a bridge approach, which was left open with no warning other than a crude
barrier one-half mile from the danger area. The evidence conclusively showed the ditch could not be seen until the driver was
quite close to it. In Thurow v. Schaeffer,5 the court was presented
with a case involving a collision between an auto and a wheat
combine at the top of a hill. The court pointed out that the combine was difficult to see as it ascended the hill, and that even though
the driver might have caught a glimpse of the top of it, he could
not foresee that the combine blades were hanging into his lane
of travel. In both cases, as in the nighttime exception cases, the
court refused to hold the drivers negligent, as a matter of law, for
Most v. Cedar County, 126 Neb. 54, 252 N.W. 465 (1934).
Swartz v. Hibdon, 174 Neb. 129, 116 N.W.2d 187 (1962) (defendant
truck driver hit rear of farm tractor which turned onto highway in
front of him; held within rule); Greyhound Corp. v. Lyman-Richey
Sand & Gravel Corp., 161 Neb. 152, 72 N.W.2d 669 (1955) (defendant
gravel truck driver struck plaintiff's bus which gradually stopped in
front of him; held negligent as a matter of law); Ricker v. Danner,
159 Neb. 675, 68 N.W.2d 338 (1955) (plaintiff coming over crest of
hill confronted with cars passing stalled truck in opposite lane, could
not stop before hitting car in front of him, swung out and hit cars
passing stalled truck; general rule applied); Armer v. Omaha &
Council Bluffs St. Ry., 151 Neb. 431, 37 N.W.2d 607 (1949) (bus struck
child on bicycle who turned left in front of it); Ross v. Carroll, 138
Neb. 1, 291 N.W. 726 (1940) (defendant drove truck thirty miles per
hour around blind curve on wrong side of highway, could not stop
or turn aside before hitting plaintiff); Hardung v. Sheldon, 133 Neb.
427, 275 N.W. 586 (1937) (defendant went up hill on wrong side of
road to avoid sand blow, plaintiff came over crest of hill and collided with defendant's car; court intimated plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law).
55 157 Neb. 527, 60 N.W.2d 604 (1953).
56 151 Neb. 651, 38 N.W.2d 732 (1949).
53
54
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not being able to comply with the range of vision rule. Their negligence, if any, was for the jury to determine.
III. THE RANGE OF VISION RULE IN OTHER STATES
All of the states which apply the range of vision rule agree that
a motorist should be required to travel at a speed such that he can
stop his vehicle before hitting an obstruction in the road, but they
disagree as to the effect of a violation of this duty. A majority of
the states adhere to the view that, in cases in which the rule is
applicable, a driver who violates it will be held negligent as a matter
of law.5 7 Nebraska falls within this group. 58 The courts in these
states, just as in Nebraska, have made exceptions to the rule in
factual situations where the obstruction struck was not plainly
visible.59
A minority of the states decline to hold that a violation of the
rule is negligence as a matter of law. In these states violation of the
range of vision rule is merely evidence of negligence, and, like other
57 DELAWARE: Staker v. McSweeney, 55 Del. 192, 185 A.2d 892 (1962);

FLORIDA: Cases collected in 9 U.

FLA.

L. REv. 234 (1956); INDIANA:

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Huss, 96 Ind. App. 71, 180 N.E. 919 (1932);
KANSAS: Bottenberg Implement Co. v. Sheffield, 171 Kan. 67, 229
P.2d 1004 (1951); LOUISIANA: Ramsey v. Langston, 140 So. 2d 775
(La. 1962); MICHIGAN: Morrison v. Demogala, 336 Mich. 298, 57
N.W.2d 893 (1953); MISSOURI: Robb v. Wallace, 371 S.W.2d 232
(Mo. 1963); NEW MEXICO: Frei v. Brownlee, 56 N.M. 677, 248 P.2d
671 (1952); NORTH CAROLINA: Singletary v. Nixon, 239 N.C. 634,
80 S.E.2d 676 (1954); NORTH DAKOTA: Wisnewski v. Oster, 110
N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1961); OHIO: Cox v. Polster, 174 Ohio St. 224,
188 N.E.2d 421 (1963)
(Rule adopted by statute, Omo REV. CODE
ANw. § 4511.21 (Anderson 1965)-Violation of statute is negligence
per se); SOUTH DAKOTA: King v. Farmers Educ. & Co-op Oil Co.,
72 S.D. 280, 3 N.W.2d 333 (1948); TENNESSEE: Garner v. Maxwell,
50 Tenn. App. 157, 360 S.W.2d 64 (1961); UTAH: Hirshbach v. Dubuque Packing Co., 7 Utah 2d 7, 316 P.2d 319 (1957); VERMONT: Slate v.
Hogback Mountain Ski Lift, 122 Vt. 8, 163 A.2d 851 (1960); WEST
VIRGINIA: Jenkins v. Chatterton, 143 W. Va. 250, 100 S.E.2d 808
(1957); WISCONSIN: Barker Barrel Co. v. Fisher, 10 Wis. 2d 197,
102 N.W.2d 107 (1960). For a good collection of cases on the range
of vision rule see the following A.L.R. annotations: Annot., 44 A.L.R.
1403 (1926); Cf. Annot., 58 A.L.R. 1493 (1929); 87 A.L.R. 900 (1923);
97 A.L.R. 546 (1935); 133 A.L.R. 967 (1941); 22 A.L.R. 2d 292 (1952);
and 42 A.L.R.2d 13 (1955).
58 Roth v. Blomquist, 117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W. 572 (1928).
59 E.g., see the Kansas, Louisiana, and North Dakota cases at note 57
supra, which hold that even though these three states adhere to the
strict view of the range of vision doctrine, there are certain exceptions to the rule. See also the Vermont case at note 57 supra, which
recognizes that the case involves an exception to the range of vision
rule as applied in Vermont.
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evidence presented in the case, must be60weighed by the jury in
determining the negligence of the driver.
This latter view is expressed in the Virginia case of Twyman v.
Adkins, 61 where the plaintiff ran into defendant's auto which
had stalled and was left standing on the right hand side of the
highway with its lights off and without any warning devices having
been placed. The court, in refusing to hold plaintiff negligent as a
matter of law, stated:
We all agree that -reasonable care should be demanded of
automobile drivers, but that reasonable care is a flexible standard
under the facts and circumstances of each case. And after all,
whatever the degree of care required, its presence or absence,
under the facts
and circumstances of each case, is for the jury
62
to determine.
Pennsylvania has evidently adopted a view somewhere between
these two positions. The Pennsylvania court has said that a person
who hits an object or obstruction on the highway is negligent as a
matter of law, but if the driver's failure to stop within his range of
vision was because his vision had been impaired by blinding lights,
snow or smoke, his negligence is for the jury to determine.6 Thus,
the driving circumstances may be considered as intervening causes,
rather than mere conditions as in Nebraska.
A large number of states, apparently feeling that the rule is too
fraught with difficulty to serve as a sure and meaningful test of
negligence, do not utilize the range of vision rule at all. California,
for example, has expressly rejected the concept, 64 while in other
states the cases do not mention the range of vision rule in factual
situations in which the rule is normally applied, and thus reject
the concept by implication.
60 ARIZONA: Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, 64 Ariz. 101,
166 P.2d 816 (1946) (Arizona had followed the strict view up until
this case); ARKANSAS: Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 174 Ark.
130, 297 S.W. 856 (1927) (on rehearing); CONNECTICUT: Kaufman
v. Hegeman Transfer & Literage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 123
A. 16 (1923); IDAHO: Stanger v. Hunter, 49 Idaho 723, 291 P. 1060
(1930); IOWA: Knaus Truck Lines v. Commercial Freight Lines, 238
Iowa 1356, 29 N.W.2d 204 (1947) (discussing application of Iowa
assured clear distance statute, see text at note 89 infra) ; MARYLAND:
Brumage v. Blubaugh, 204 Md. 144, 102 A.2d 568 (1954); MASSACHUSETTS: Woolner v. Perry, 265 Mass. 74, 163 N.E. 750 (1928); MINNESOTA: Lee v. Smith, 253 Minn. 401, 92 N.W.2d 117 (1958); OREGON:
Murphy v. Hawthorne, 117 Ore. 319, 244 P. 79 (1926); TEXAS: Cases
collected in 28 TEXAS L. REV. 120 (1949); WASHINGTON: Morehouse
v. Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 P. 157; Annot., 58 A.L.R. 1482 (1929).
61 168 Va. 456, 191 S.E. 615 (1937).
62 Id. at 465, 191 S.E. at 618-19 (emphasis added).
63 McElroy v. Rozzi, 194 Pa. Super. 184, 166 A.2d 331 (1960).
64 Burgesser v. Bullock's Estate, 190 Cal. 673, 214 P. 649 (1923).
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IV. MISAPPLICATION OF THE RULE

A.

THE NATURE OF A DRIVER's RANGE OF VISION

In order to understand how the range of vision rule may be
misapplied, the exact nature of a driver's range of vision must
be understood. The range of vision of a driver in a moving vehicle
resembles a cone extending outward in front of the vehicle. 65 The
cone moves down the highway in front of the vehicle at the same
speed that the vehicle is traveling. The range of vision rule requires a driver to travel at such a speed that his stopping distance
will always be shorter than the maximum length of his cone of
vision so that he will be able to stop before hitting an obstruction
which becomes visible just as it penetrates the end of the cone.
It does not follow, however, that the range of vision rule is
violated every time an object penetrates the driver's cone of vision
and is struck. When an object penetrates the driver's cone of vision
from the side rather than the end it usually becomes discernable
short of the driver's safe stopping distance, and it is physically
impossible to avoid a collision by applying the brakes. To apply
the rule under such circumstances is most unjust. In effect it fastens
negligence upon the driver regardless of any fault, and bears a
striking resemblance to strict liability. If he is to avoid this result,
it would force a driver to travel at an extremely slow rate of speed
and observe the road beyond the usual requirement of reasonable
care. Surely the court which formulated the range of vision rule
must not have intended such a harsh application. When the courts
say a driver must be prepared to stop before striking an object
which enters his range of vision, they must impliedly be adding
the proviso that the object must penetrate the driver's cone of
vision from the end of the cone and thus beyond the reasonable
stopping distance of the driver.
65 The fact that the field of vision of a driver in a moving car resembles

a cone has been established by scientific testing. A study undertaken
by the Keystone View Company of Meadville, Pennsylvania, indicates that when a vehicle is stopped the driver has a field of vision
of 180 degrees or more. At 30 miles per hour or more the field of vision
is reduced to approximately 96 degrees, that is, one-half of what it
was in a stationary vehicle. At 60 miles per hour the driver's field
of vision has narrowed to only 42 degrees, and the driver is, in
effect, looking through a tunnel. The Nebraska Driver's Manual published by the Department of Motor Vehicles states, at page 43:
"Driver vision is greatly affected by speed. A person driving at 50
miles per hour sees 14% less than when driving at 45 miles per hour.
And at 60 miles per hour, his usable vision is narrowed to about
the width of the road."

THE RANGE OF VISION RULE IN NEBRASKA
B.

VEmcLrEs APPROACHING EACH OTHER ON A STRAIGHT AwD LEVEL
HIGHwAY

The Nebraska court has dealt with only one case in which the
range of vision rule was sought to be applied to vehicles which
were approaching each other on a straight and level stretch of road.
In O'Neill v. Henke6" the defendant had been drinking and was
weaving down a gravel road at seventy miles an hour. He swerved
into the wrong lane of travel a short distance in front of plaintiff's
truck and the two vehicles collided. The defendant claimed that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in not being
able to stop before the collision occurred. The court, obviously
impressed with defendant's reckless conduct and intoxicated state,
refused to apply the range of vision rule as to the plaintiff.
This disposition of the case was proper even if the evidence had
failed to show that drinking and reckless driving on the part of the
defendant were involved. When the defendant swerved into the
plaintiff's lane, a short distance in front of him, he penetrated the
plaintiff's cone of vision from the side only a short distance in
front of plaintiff's truck, thus not affording plaintiff a reasonable
opportunity to stop.
It is submitted that the range of vision rule should not be applied
to collisions between vehicles meeting each other when one vehicle
strays into the improper lane of travel, unless the vehicle enters
the wrong lane of travel a sufficient distance in front of the other
vehicle so that it penetrates the driver's cone of vision from the
end rather than from the side, and thus affords that driver a
sufficient distance to stop.
C. HmnToP CoLUisioNs
The Nebraska court has applied the range of vision rule in a
number of cases67 involving hilltop collisions, including the first daytime range of vision case, Most v. Cedar County.e8 In Most a motorcyclist struck a road scraper just after he came over the crest of a
hill. The road scraper was being operated against traffic up the
wrong side of the hill without any warning that it was being so
operated. The court held the motorcyclist contributorily negligent
as a matter of law and denied him recovery.
66 167 Neb. 631, 94 N.W.2d 322 (1959).

For these Nebraska cases see the Hardung and Fulcher cases at note 18
. 54, 252 N.W. 465 (1934).
68 126 Neb.
67

68pr1
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Other hilltop cases have involved cars which were stopped in the
lane of travel just over the crest of a hill and cars which were
somewhat off the road but still interfering with traffic. Such obstructions are difficult to anticipate, and applying the range of vision
rule to drivers who strike them would seem undesirable. In Andelt
v. County of Seward,69 a case in which the court refused to apply
the rule because the object struck was not "plainly visible," the
Nebraska court observed that if the range of vision rule were applied strictly to every case "any motorist driving Nebraska highways would be required to maintain a rate of speed that would
enable him to stop in 50 to 100 feet, lest he hit a hidden defect in a
highway not discernible theretofore and be barred from recovery
as a matter of law. Such is not the law."70 However, it would seem
that the court is requiring a speed such that a driver must always
be prepared to stop within 50 to 100 feet on hilly roads when the
court applies the range of vision rule to hilltop accidents. The
driver must creep over the crest of the hill or run the risk of being
held negligent as a matter of law if he strikes an obstruction beyond
his view just over that crest.
It is true that a driver approaching the crest of a hill finds his
range of vision ahead momentarily decreased, but should he have to
decrease his speed every time he goes over a hill? In the hilly parts
of Nebraska, such a rule would materially slow the flow of traffic.
A motorist nearing the crest of a hill should be able to assume that
the road ahead is free of negligently placed obstructions, absent
71
warning to the contrary, and cases in other states have so held.
As between the driver coming over the hill and the person responsible for obstructing the highway, the person obstructing the
highway is in a better position to prevent the accident. In addition,
to apply the range of vision rule to the driver who has struck a
vehicle ascending the hill on the wrong side of the road, as in
Hardung v. Sheldon,72 would emasculate the statute which says that
drivers shall not pass on hills or curves where their vision is
impaired.

69 157 Neb. 527, 60 N.W.2d 604 (1953).
70 Id. at 532, 60 N.W.2d at 607.
71 The Arizona court in Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, 64
Ariz. 101, 166 P.2d 816 (1946), said: "A person traveling upon a high-

way, ascending a hill, on a curve and through a cut, is not presumed
to anticipate that a vehicle ascending the hill from the opposite direction will be traveling on the wrong side of the road...." Id. at
115, 166 P.2d at 824.
72

133 Neb. 427, 275 N.W. 586 (1937).
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D.

VEHiCLES APPROACHING EACH OTHER ON CURVES

While it is true that a sharp curve also impairs a driver's vision,
a literal application of the range of vision rule to vehicles which
collide as they meet on a curve could often achieve an unjust
7 3 the rule was
result. In the early Nebraska case of Ross v. Carroll,
applied where two drivers collided on a blind curve. It appeared
that one of the drivers had entered the curve too fast, was forced
to take the curve wide, and was in the wrong lane when the accident
occurred. The court applied the range of vision rule against the
driver who had strayed into the wrong lane to hold him negligent
as a matter of law. The case was probably decided correctly upon
the facts presented, but application of the range of vision rule
to the vehicles in this case is questionable. Speed, insofar as it
related to stopping distance, was not the cause of this accident.
The proximate cause was speed in relation to the driver's ability
to negotiate the turn while remaining in his own lane of travel.
A later case involving vehicles meeting on a curve is Davis v.
Dennert,7 4 where the driver of the vehicle which strayed into the
wrong lane and was struck claimed that the other driver had not
been driving within the range of his vision, since he could not stop
in time to avoid the accident. The court properly refused to apply
the rule, stating that the rule was correctly applied only:
where the collision was between a moving automobile and an
object which relative to the automobile was stationary. ... But to
apply it to approaching vehicles colliding with each other would
violate the very reason by which the rule is supported.
A user of the highways may assume, unless and until he has
warning, notice, or knowledge to the contrary, that other users of

the highway will use them in a lawful manner... 75

The courts in other states have said that the rule should not be
applied against a driver who strikes another vehicle being operated
in the wrong lane around a curve 7 6 They agree that a driver should
be able to assume, absent suitable warning, that others will not
travel around curves in the wrong lane in violation of state statutes
and rules of the road.
E. OBJECTS TURNING OR CROSSING IN FRONT OF DRivE
When a vehicle turns onto the highway, crosses the highway or
otherwise crosses the path of a driver a short distance in front of
73

74

138 Neb. 1, 291 N.W. 726 (1940).

162 Neb. 65, 75 N.W.2d 112 (1956).

Id. at 71, 75 N.W.2d at 117.
76 It would seem that the rationale of the hill cases also applies to
75

curves. Note the language in the Alabam Freight Lines case at note
71 supra. See also Davis v. Dennert at note 74 supra.
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his car, that vehicle penetrates the driver's cone of vision from the
side, and the range of vision rule should not be applied.
Such a situation was presented in Roth v. Blomquist.7 7 The
court seized upon plaintiff's testimony that his headlights lighted
the road forty to fifty feet ahead, but that he first saw the horses
twenty to twenty-five feet ahead, plus the fact that he was unable to
stop before colliding with the wagon, as proving that plaintiff was
not alert and was not driving at a speed that allowed him to stop
within the range of his vision. From the testimony given in the
case it is equally probable that the reason Roth did not see the
horses in time to stop was that the horses entered the area
illuminated by his headlights from the side-within his cone of
vision-but that possibility was completely ignored by the court.
Assuming the latter probability to be true, the fact that Roth could
not stop before the accident happened did not mean he was
traveling so fast that he could not stop within the range of his
headlights, but rather that the horses and wagon crossed his path
within his cone of vision and short of his stopping distance, so that
he could not possibly stop in time.
Clearly then, the rule should not be applied unless it can be
shown that the object crossing the highway crossed far enough
ahead of the driver so that it penetrated his cone of vision from
the end rather than from the side, thus affording him an opportunity
to stop in time.
Another such example is presented in Schwartz v. Hibdon.78 In
that case, plaintiff turned his slow-moving farm tractor onto the
highway in front of defendant's truck, and defendant was unable
to stop or otherwise avoid a collision. Here again, the vehicle
entered the driver's cone of vision from the side, and the range of
vision rule should not have been applied.
Probably the most inappropriate application of the rule, however, took place in Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. 79 In
Armer, a nine-year-old girl on a bicycle turned left into an alley
from the middle of the street across the path of a bus driven by
defendant's driver. The evidence showed that the girl had given
no signal and had turned directly in front of the bus. The driver
was traveling forty miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour
zone, so the result of the case, allowing the girl to recover, was
probably correct. However, the court should not have utilized the
range of vision rule to hold the bus driver negligent in this factual
77
78
79

117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W. 572 (1928).
174 Neb. 129, 116 N.W.2d 187 (1962).
151 Neb. 431, 37 N.W.2d 607 (1949).
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situation. The obstruction entered the driver's cone of vision from
the side and so close to the bus that the driver could scarcely have
gotten his foot on the brake pedal, let alone stop.80
Courts in other states have recognized that the rule should be
inapplicable when the obstruction enters the driver's cone of vision
from the side. In Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co.,s1 the Ohio court
reviewed many decisions involving the "range of vision" or "assured
clear distance" rule, both from the states which had adopted the
rule by statutory enactment and those which had done so by
judicial decision. The court concluded that while the rule requires
a driver to drive in such a manner that he can stop before hitting
an obstruction that comes within his range of vision, it should not be
applied where:
... such assured clear distance ahead is suddenly cut down or lessened, without his fault, by the entrance within such clear distance
ahead and into his path or line of travel of some obstruction
which renders him unable,
in the exercise of ordinary care, to
2
avoid colliding therewith.8
The court held that, in such cases, the driver's negligence, if any,
was for the jury to determine. This statement of the rule would
ensure that the court would not misapply the range of vision concept
to accidents where the obstruction entered the driver's cone of
vision from the side rather than from the end in such a manner
that it is not possible for the driver to stop. It is submitted that
the Nebraska Supreme Court should expressly adopt this qualification to the range of vision rule.
80 A recent case, Beck v. Trustin, 177 Neb. 788, 131 N.W.2d 425 (1964),
indicates a better handling of this situation. The evidence was in dispute as to whether a pedestrian had stepped into the beam from the
headlights of defendant's car sufficiently ahead of defendant to allow
him a reasonable opportunity to stop. The court refused to hold
defendant negligent as a matter of law and submitted the question
to the jury. However, the court's language is disturbing where it
observes: "The defendant argues the plaintiff approached at a right
angle to the path of travel of his automobile. This does not change
the situation." Id. at 801, 131 N.W.2d at 433 (emphasis added). This
quotation would indicate the court is still not prepared to recognize
an exception to the range of vision rule when the object struck
enters the driver's cone of vision from the side. But see, Brazier v.
English, 177 Neb. 889, 131 N.W.2d 601 (1964) where the court did
recognize this exception to the rule where plaintiff's auto moved into
defendant's lane just in front of defendant and then suddenly stopped
to make a right turn without signaling. The court properly submitted
the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury rather'than holding
him negligent as a matter of law. See also Waite v. Briggs, 175 Neb.
104, 120 N.W.2d 547 (1963) (plaintiff turned from side street onto
street in front of bus).
81 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941).
82 Id. at 88, 33 N.E.2d at 7.
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V.

INEQUITY OF THE NEBRASKA VIEW

NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW

It has already been asserted that the viability of the range of
vision rule in Nebraska is subject to some question. Its origin was
in an earlier age, and is neither desirable, nor needed in our
modern society. Horsedrawn vehicles have nearly disappeared.
Livestock is no longer legally allowed to roam the roads. Roads,
for the most part, are paved and washouts are infrequent. When
road repairs must be made, those making them have a duty to
provide adequate warning. The strict duty of care imposed upon
the driver of 1909 is no longer realistic in the age of seventy-five
mile an hour interstate highway travel.8 3 As the Connecticut court
said as early as 1923:
The defendants would force the traveler to assume that the
highway was liable to be obstructed, and in view of this to so
travel that he should not collide with any obstruction in the highway, however negligently it may have been maintained upon it.
It would thus impose upon the traveler the exercise of extraordinary care instead of ordinary care .... 84
83 In fact the driver on the interstate seldom drives within the range
of his vision, especially at night, if he travels at the seventy-five
miles an hour allowed. The posted speed limit is certainly misleading if the interstate driver assumes that by staying below it he can
avoid being held negligent in case of an accident. NEB. REV. STAT. §
39-780 (Reissue 1968) provides that all vehicles traveling on Nebraska
highways shall be equipped with headlights such that the driver
can discern a man standing two hundred feet in front of his vehicle.
Assuming that headlights reach at least that far, a vehicle traveling
seventy-five miles an hour cannot stop short of two hundred thirty
five feet under the best conditions, that is, on new, rough concrete
which is dry. Thus, at seventy-five miles per hour the driver is overdriving his range of vision. This point was articulated in the concurring opinion in Kehm v. Dumpert, 183 Neb. 568, 162 N.W.2d 520
(1968), wherein Justice McCown argues that in all range of vision
cases the question of the driver's negligence should be decided by
the jury rather than by the trial court as a matter of law. He observes:
"All sorts of conflicts are apparent in retention of the rule. For
example, a motorist driving on the interstate highway at night with
low-beam headlights at anything close to the 75-mile per hour
speed limit, would be guilty of negligence as a matter of law; while
if he is charged with negligence in exceeding the 75-mile speed limit,
the jury is simply instructed that violation of the speed limit is not,
in and of itself, negligence, but may be evidence of negligence. It
seems obvious that the general rule in its old form no longer fits
present circumstances of traffic and highway regulations." Id. at 574,
162 N.W.2d at 524.

See Cook, Speed Calculations and the Expert Witness, 42 NEB. L.
(Appendix A and B) for stopping distance
calculations.
84 Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Literage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn.
REV. 100, 125-26 (1962)

114, 117, 123 A. 16, 17 (1923).
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The Washington court has pointed out that strict application
of the rule serves to excuse the negligence of others and tends to
completely emasculate the statutes which prohibit parking on the
highway and those which require the placing of a warning sign to
mark obstructions. That court stated that a driver traveling at
night has at least some right to assume that the road ahead of him
is safe for travel unless dangers on the road are marked by red
lights at night or flags and signs by day.8 5
It has also been pointed out that requiring a driver to slow down
every time his vision is impaired temporarily could cause more harm
than good:
To make the rule hard and fast would prevent the forward
motion of a car meeting another with brilliant lights on a street
or highway, or making left turns. It would frequently present a
situation where the stopping of a car on a street or highway, or
the lessening
of its speed, would create a greater hazard than to
go forward.86
Bearing in mind the general improvement of our highways and
the desirability of swift travel, it is obvious that a rule which
forces a driver to assume that the road will be obstructed at every
turn and requires him to creep along so that he can stop before
hitting an obstruction or be held negligent as a matter of law,
belongs to an earlier age of highway travel. In Nebraska in 1969, a
driver should be able to assume, absent any warning, that at least
the interstate, federal highways, major paved state highways and
arterial city streets will be free from negligently placed obstructions.
Another telling criticism of the Nebraska application of the
range of vision rule is that the court may tend to erroneously apply
the rule in some cases where the appearance of the object struck is
such that it is not plainly visible. The court looks at the evidence
and decides that the appearance of the object is such that the case
will not fall within the "not plainly visible" exception to the rule
and withdraws the question of the appearance of the object from
the jury. This is not to say that there are no cases in which the
appearance of the object struck is such that reasonable minds could
not differ as to its visibility. No one would dispute the plainly
visible character of a clean, shiny, red auto on the shoulder of the
road on a clear day when visibility was good. At night no one
would have much doubt about a car parked along the side of the
road with all its lights on and suitable warning devices placed to
warn that the vehicle was partially obstructing the highway. How85 Morehouse v. Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 409, 252 P. 157, 160 (1926).
86 Twyman v. Adkins, 168 Va. 456, 464, 191 S.E. 615, 618 (1937).
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ever, there can be a wide variation in the appearance of various
types of obstructions, and the court has had a great deal of difficulty
deciding whether reasonable minds could differ as to the visible
character of certain obstructions. The Nebraska court has said that
the "not plainly visible" exception should embrace every situation
in which reasonable minds could differ, but its decisions do not
always measure up to this test.8 7 It seems that in most cases the
question of whether the driver should have seen the obstruction
should be one for the jury. It is submitted that the court should
move carefully when making pronouncements as a matter of law
in such a difficult area.
Even where the testimony of witnesses as to the appearance of
the obstruction has been in dispute, the court has not hesitated to
decide, as a matter of law, whether the obstruction was plainly
visible. An extreme example of this is presented in Guerin v.
88
Forburger.
In Guerin, the accident took place as it was growing
dark. Plaintiff's automobile smashed into the back of defendant's
flat bed truck which was either stopped or moving very slowly in
the right hand lane of travel. The truck was hauling stone which
was a chalky white to yellow in appearance and blended with the
mist which was falling in the growing dusk. The back of the truck
was striped black and white, but was dirty. From the evidence
it appeared that most of the lights on the truck were lit, but there
was dispute as to whether the left tail light and left clearance light
were lit at the time of the accident. A number of witnesses testified as to the appearance of the truck shortly before the accident.
Some said the truck was quite difficult to see when they passed it,
87

Compare the following cases which hold that the driver was bound
to see the obstructing vehicle with the cases at notes 39 and 42 supra,
which hold that the obstructing vehicle was within the "not plainly
visible" exception to the general rule: Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401,
34 N.W.2d 757 (1948) (car parked partly on highway, stopped to add

oil, dispute as to whether lights on or off); Buresh v. George, 149
Neb. 340, 31 N.W.2d 106 (1948)

(stalled truck, out of gas, dark

paint, no reflectors, tail light not lit, lattice truck body, difficult to
see; held within rule, since nearby streetlight somewhat illuminated
truck); Hendren v. Hill, 131 Neb. 163, 267 N.W. 340 (1936)

(car

stopped with flat tire, no lights burning, hauling furniture piled high
on car, mattress which was fastened to back of car was light gray
which blended with pavement). The distinction the court draws
between these two groups of cases is very thin. Certainly in close
cases like these the court ought not be casting cases on one side or
the other as a matter of law. In close factual situations like these, a
jury question is presented.
88161 Neb. 824, 74 N.W.2d 870 (1956). But see, Bartosh v. Schlautman,
181 Neb. 130, 147 N.W.2d 492 (1966) and the discussion concerning
that case at text accompanying footnote 46 supra.
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and others said it was readily visible. The Nebraska court, however, announced that the appearance of the truck was such that the
driver should have seen it and held the plaintiff negligent as a
matter of law, thus upsetting a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the
trial court.
The court should generally refrain from making a determination
of the plainly visible character of the object struck. Rather, that
question should be left for the jury to decide, and it should certainly
do so in cases like Guerin where the evidence as to the appearance
of the obstruction is in dispute.
VI. REMEDIAL PROPOSALS
Strict application of the range of vision rule has troubled the
Nebraska court, as evidenced by its attempt to moderate the harsh
effect of the rule in certain cases by creating exceptions. But
instead of providing a solution for a complex problem, this creation
of exceptions has led to a tangle which leaves the Nebraska law on
the subject in a great state of confusion. A solution is needed which
gives a greater role to jury findings on questions of fact and
eliminates the need of creating the bothersome exceptions and
wrestling with the problem of the plainly visible obstruction as a
matter of law in close cases.
One alternative is to adopt the minority view, that violation of
the range of vision rule does not make a driver negligent as a matter
of law but is merely evidence of negligence to be considered by the
jury in deciding the case. This solution would eliminate many of the
problems presented by the Nebraska cases because it frees the
court from deciding the applicability of the rule as a matter of law
in close cases. However, it has the disadvantage of weakening the
effect of the range of vision rule in cases in which the rule may be
properly applied, since the jury may find the driver against whom
the rule is applied non-negligent in cases in which the driver is
clearly at fault. The argument contra is that most drivers are
unaware of the rule, and, as a deterent to speeding, posted speed
limits rigidly enforced, are much more effective; in other words,
the rule is simply a tool in determining compensation, not in detering wrongful conduct.
A second alternative is to do away with the range of vision
concept altogether, as has been done in some states, and determine
the issue of the driver's negligent speed by reference to other rules
of the road or statutes, such as "a speed reasonably prudent under
existing conditions." This approach does not simply weaken the
range of vision rule but rather scraps it altogether in favor of other
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concepts which may prove as difficult of application to varying facts
as did the range of vision rule. However, this view may more
adequately reflect a realistic approach to travel on controlled access
highways where the perils of the road mentioned in Lauson have,
for the most part, disappeared.
Unfortunately, all Nebraska highways do not meet interstate
standards and it may be concluded that the range of vision rule still
is proper in this state until more controlled access highways are
constructed. The criticisms directed at the range of vision rule tend
to obscure the fact that it is a perfectly just rule when applied in
proper factual situations. The real problem, of course, is to
determine just what cases merit application of the rule. In Iowa,
where the range of vision rule has been adopted by statute, the
courts apparently experienced similar difficulties as in the application of the Nebraska view. Their solution merits consideration as
a third alternative. In order to remedy the difficulties presented
by the Nebraska view, the Iowa assured clear distance statute was
amended and now reads:
... and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a
speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within
the assured clear distance ahead, such driver having the right to
assume, however, that all persons using said highway will obsevre

the law.89

This modification would eliminate many of the problems which
plague the range of vision rule in Nebraska. Although the change
in the Iowa rule was made by statutory amendment, probably no
legislative action would be necessary to modify the rule in Nebraska, since our rule was created by judicial decision and may be
changed in the same manner.
Under the Iowa rule, the difficulty of the plainly visible test is
eliminated. The question is no longer whether the driver could see
the obstruction. Instead the test is whether the object struck was
illegally placed and maintained or illegally driven upon the highway. If it is shown that the person responsible for the presence of
the obstruction violated some legal duty in allowing it to be there,
the driver striking the obstruction is excused. In nearly all of the
Nebraska cases in which the court has excused the driver who
collided with the obstruction because it was not plainly visible, the
obstruction's poorly visible character was due to a violation of
some legal duty on the part of the person responsible for the obstruction. The "violation of a legal duty" test is much more certain
89 IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.285

amendment).

(Reissue 1966)

(emphasis denotes the
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and is easier to apply than the "plainly visible" test. Of course,
not every illegal act of the person responsible for the obstruction
would excuse the driver who struck it for having violated the range
of vision rule. The illegal act or omission must be shown to be the
proximate cause of the driver's failure to see the object, and thus
the reason for his inability to stop before he struck the object which
entered his range of vision. The proximate cause determination is
made by the jury.
One can envision some instances in which the obstruction would
not be visible because of no illegal act or omission on the part of
the person responsible for the obstruction. For example, where a
car stalls in the middle of the highway at night with its lights
shorted out through no fault on the part of its driver and is struck
by a vehicle following it, its poorly visible character was not due
to the failure of its driver to observe the law. In these cases, the
court would have to apply the old plainly visible test, but should
generally leave the determination of the plainly visible character
of the obstruction to the jury. Hopefully there will be few such
cases.
The range of vision rule would continue to be applied in those
cases in which the person responsible for the obstruction had not
violated some legal duty in placing the obstruction where it was,
or where violation of the legal duty was not the proximate cause
of the accident. Negligence as a matter of law would not seem
an unfair rule when the range of vision rule encompasses the
exception the Iowa modification would make, and where the application of the rule is confined to factual situations in which the
obstruction enters the driver's cone of vision from the end rather
than from the side. For instance, where an auto strikes a vehicle
which has suddenly turned onto the highway in front of it, the case
would present an exception to the range of vision rule, since the
turning vehicle did not "observe the law" when it failed to yield
the right of way until the other auto had passed. Similar considerations would govern accidents caused by cars in the wrong lane on
hills or curves, cars swerving when meeting one another on a
straight and level stretch of road, and cars which obstruct the road
by stopping or parking on the pavement just over the crest of a hill.
Adoption of the Iowa modification would shift the burden of
preventing accidents from the traveler who is unaware that the
highway is obstructed to the person who, through some illegal act
or omission, is responsible for the hazard to travel, and who, after
all, is in a better position to prevent the accident. It would allow
the driver to assume, absent adequate warning, that the highway
ahead is clear.
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The conditions which compelled the decision in the Lauson case
in 1909 have disappeared, and the range of vision rule should be
modified in accordance with the changed conditions. Adoption of
the Iowa modification to the range of vision rule would best accomplish this change while leaving the rule viable enough to be
applied in factual situations in which that application would reach
a just result.

